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1. Introduction 
General public debates on international relocation in the EU-15 generally focus on the process 
in its narrow sense: a company closing a plant in one of EU-15 countries while 
simultaneously opening a plant in a low-wage emerging country where it will produce goods 
at lower costs to be offered on the same market as previously. We will consider here 
relocation processes in a broader sense: production relocation from ‘Northern’ countries to 
low-wage economies, initiated by a ‘Northern’ company choosing to locate or to outsource 
part of or all its production in a Southern area;  a ‘Northern’ company leaving its ‘Northern’ 
supplier of intermediate consumption purchases for a supplier in a southern country; a 
‘Northern’ company of the trade sector leaving a supplier in a ‘Northern country’ for a 
supplier in a southern country; a ‘Southern’ company winning market shares over  ‘Northern’ 
companies, first in its domestic market, then in third countries and finally in ‘Northern’ 
countries themselves. International relocation processes are difficult both to measure and to 
stop.  
International relocation or in other words ‘delocalisation’ will be addressed in this paper from 
a French policy perspective. The issue was already very topical 12 years ago and focused on 
how to tackle relocation of traditional production industries, mainly textile (as well as shoe 
and leather) industries, from France to Asian newly emerging economies. At that time a 
number of politicians raised the issue of introducing fiscal measures to stop delocalisation 
(see Arthuis, 1993, Lauré, 1993). Among the ideas were: lowering taxation on low-skilled 
labour, introducing a social VAT, i.e. compensatory duties (droits compensateurs) on imports 
from developing countries (see Lauré, 1993, and, for a critical view, Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 
1994).  
International relocation and the domestic job losses involved became again highly topical in 
2004, as elsewhere in Europe, with several reports being released: Fontagné and Lorenzi 
(2004), Grignon (2004) and Roustan (2004). The 2005 budget contains several measures 
aiming at promoting the attractiveness of specific French areas. It is worth noting that over the 
last 10 years, the policy debate has moved from supporting low-skilled employment in 
traditional industries to supporting high-tech industries and possibly employment in 
‘sheltered’ services (see Letournel, 2004). Some French economists, like Messerlin (2004), 
think French labour, goods and services markets are too regulated and should simply be 
deregulated, with no other measures needed. But a majority of French economists think 
measures should be introduced either to support endangered industries or to favour the 
emergence of well-positioned industries. 
Section 2 discusses the potential impacts of relocation from Northern to Southern countries 
and policy answers. Section 3 addresses global strategies aiming at promoting growth and 
competitiveness in line with the Lisbon Strategy based on research and innovation. Section 4 
addresses proposals aiming at the promotion of top-priority sectors. Section 5 considers 
measures in favour of unskilled workers. Section 6 describes and discusses specific measures 
taken by the French government to stop relocation. Section 7 concludes.    
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2. Potential impacts of international relocation and policy answers 
The emergence of low-wage countries in international trade has seven main impacts on 
Northern countries: 
1) Imports from the ‘South’ rapidly increase their market share in Northern domestic 
markets, especially for goods requiring a high proportion of unskilled labour. 
2) Southern countries rapidly increase their market share in Northern foreign markets, 
especially for goods requiring a high proportion of unskilled labour.  
3) Southern countries increase their imports of capital intensive or skilled-labour 
intensive products made in Northern countries.  
4) The low prices of Southern produced goods reduce price levels in Northern countries 
and thereby increase consumers’ purchasing power in these countries. 
5) The weakening of labour demand for unskilled workers and the threats of 
delocalisation exert a downward pressure on unskilled workers’ wages. Depending on 
the country, these wages will either drop (which will raise inequalities and dampen 
consumption) or be maintained (which will contribute to raise unemployment). 
Depending on the country, taxation or social measures will be introduced, or not, to 
reduce the rise in inequalities.   
6) Northern companies will try to sell on rapidly growing Southern markets and will 
invest less in the North. This explains part of the observed stagnation of company 
investments in some European countries.   
7) Capital flows towards Southern countries and their exports’ income lead to an 
appreciation of their exchange rate, except if there is a significant rise in Southern 
imports of capital goods produced in the North. This exchange rate appreciation limits 
the size of delocalisation. However Southern countries can avoid this to occur through 
accumulating foreign currency reserves, like China does.  
The impact of the emergence of Southern countries on employment in the North must not 
only be considered from a global point of view in a long run perspective, but also in a 
medium term perspective (what are the adjustment costs for the productive system?) and in 
terms of employment structure: the cuts in unskilled jobs add to those resulting from technical 
progress. Even if they are smaller in numbers, they are more sudden and more concentrated in 
some specific sectors. Trading-off unskilled for high-skilled jobs is not necessarily good news 
for employment in the countries where unskilled unemployment is already high. 
Should European countries implement policy measures to fight deindustrialisation, i.e. the 
decline of production industries both as a share of total output and in terms of employment 
levels? Three views are opposed. The free-market view states that deindustrialisation is a 
natural phenomenon for European economies. Production has already moved from agriculture 
to industry in modern economies. These countries should now rely on the one hand on high 
skilled jobs in research and development, innovation and management and on the other hand 
on employment in services. This is a sine qua non condition for raising productivity. No 
public policy should be implemented to stop the international relocation process. On the 
contrary, relocation should be encouraged through opening frontiers and allowing for free 
competition. The world market will set the level of wages of high skilled workers. Services 
sectors will remain widely sheltered from international competition, and hence the wage level 
of ‘sheltered’ workers in services will be set at a domestic level and will rise in line with  high 
skilled workers employment. Wages should be set both in services sectors and for high skilled 
workers through a market process. There is no guarantee that the market equilibrium will be 
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socially acceptable and that income inequalities will not be excessive. But there is no 
alternative (TINA, as Margaret Thatcher said).  
‘Reformists’ think that there is a significant risk for Europe to be badly positioned in world 
competition. First, research and development as well as education spending are too low. 
Second, there are a number of rigidities in terms of labour legislation, wage bargaining 
institutions and laws restricting dismissal. Second, the welfare state weighs strongly on 
sectors facing fierce competition from abroad. The European social model needs to be 
reformed in order to become more competitive. Risk taking firms and workers must be 
supported. This implies supporting well-performing and innovating industries. The growth of 
these sectors will compensate for the employment losses in unskilled industries. How should 
this support take place? Two views can be found. In one view, the general environment of 
companies needs to be improved, taxes need to be reduced, labour legislation must be 
reformed, incentives need to be introduced (through research tax credits for instance). In 
another view, support should be given to specific companies – helping the emergence of and 
supporting European champions – and to specific innovative sectors, like biotechnologies. To 
a certain extent this view is similar with the free-market one: more jobs in technology 
industries will increase the number of jobs available for ‘medium’ skilled workers, which in 
turn will make more jobs available for unskilled workers. Here also, the final degree of 
income inequalities is unknown. 
Last, the ‘archaic’ view asks for specific support to be implemented in favour of unskilled 
labour as the functioning of economies per se raises social inequalities and makes unskilled 
workers unemployed, which cannot be accepted. Here also two views can be found. In one 
view, industrial sectors and national companies being in difficulty should be supported, a 
certain level of protectionism should be maintained, unfair competition should be fought, 
areas where employment is strongly affected should be subsidised. In another view, unskilled 
workers only should be subsidised, without interfering with production choices. These 
transfers may be found counterproductive because they benefit the losers and must be paid by 
the winners. Moreover, globalisation makes it difficult to raise taxes on high income people 
and healthy companies with a view to help people on lowest incomes and companies in 
difficulty. Individuals and companies subject to taxation may decide to leave for a country 
where taxation is lower. 
3. Promoting growth and competitiveness 
The Lisbon Strategy and the Sapir Report (2003) claim for a successful ‘way out’ for Europe: 
making the European economy the most innovative of the world. The aim is to compete with 
the US but not with China; to export to rapidly growing markets rather than in slowly growing 
(or not growing at all) European markets and to specialise in high value added sectors. 
More European and national resources should be devoted to higher research and development 
spending and to higher education, by creating ‘excellence poles’ in Europe. Structural reforms 
should take place to increase mobility and risk-taking incentives.  
Specific taxation rules should be introduced for companies operating at a European level, in 
order to allow them to take advantage of economies of scale; markets should be more rapidly 
deregulated and open.  
This strategy raises six   issues:  
1) The State should create a business-friendly environment rather than help specific 
companies. DG Competition prevents Member States from implementing industrial policies. 
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But, in many cases, supporting specific companies or research areas could prove more 
efficient to raise growth in Europe.  
2) Is it possible to promote scientific education and research in a context where financial 
profitability is a major objective?  
3) Should European economies accept the death of traditional industries that are the more 
labour-intensive, to concentrate on highly profitable activities involving a very limited 
number of very high skilled jobs?  
4) Should European countries encourage their companies to develop mainly on external 
markets, at the risk of having the companies relocating their production abroad?  
5) This policy leaves aside traditional sectors in difficulty. It gives an incentive to firms for 
leaving these sectors. Will the development of high-technology sectors be sufficient to bring 
back a satisfactory level of employment?  
6) What kind of jobs can we offers to the manual-oriented young men, if no workers job are 
available in Europe ?   
Some aspects of the Lisbon strategy can be found in French reports, suggesting for instance to 
support R&D and innovation though taxation measures (Grignon, 2004). 
According to Fontagné and Lorenzi (2004), the importance of scientific and technical issues 
should be restored in the European culture and education. The European enterprise should be 
promoted. Funding innovation should be made easier. The Report lists 10 priorities. 7 of them 
are part of this strategy: developing technology universities (Universités de technologie); 
adopting a small business act; unifying the European innovation equity stock exchanges; 
increasing the role of the European Science Foundation; introducing a surveillance of the 
relocation of headquarters; introducing rules applying to ‘European companies’; promoting 
mergers between European Member States companies.  
Other suggested measures aim at increasing European attractiveness (Grignon, 2004): 
- Improving the legislation of productive activities. 
- Making easier new company launch and company ownership transfers (by inheritance or 
sale). 
-  Strengthening competitive advantages (quality of infrastructure, low energy prices) 
- Promoting employability (higher education, professional training); deregulating labour 
markets; increasing flexibility and mobility 
- Harmonising company taxation, public aid and social legislation in Europe. 
-Promoting norms, patents and European labels. 
-Promoting the harmonisation of social and environmental standards at world level and 
rewarding the fulfilment of these norms at an international level with the help of the 
consumers. 
4. Promoting high-priority sectors, implementing industrial policies again 
Among recent reports, Fontagné and Lorenzi (2004) suggest that competition policies and 
industrial policies in Europe should be rebalanced. Specific (i.e. restricted to a small group of 
European companies), industrial co-operation should be promoted, ‘European champions’ 
should be promoted albeit increasing the SMEs’ capacity to adapt.  
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An aggressive strategy would consist in helping firms to produce higher-technology products 
for rapidly growing markets. Industry and innovation should become national priorities. Large 
programmes in top-priority sectors should be favoured.  
Three priorities are listed: giving a ‘brand name’ to competitiveness poles; defining priority 
sectors at the European Council’s level; setting a group of 3 European industrial managers to 
suggest initiatives supporting these sectors.  
The Roustan Report (2004) suggests that State implements again a strategy to increase 
research funding and piloting innovations. The report recommends the issue to be tackled at 
the European level: less competition versus more industrial policies, research subsidies, tax 
harmonisation and rebuilding local area attractiveness through local public action. The Report 
also underlines that European enlargement may provide higher growth. 
The Grignon report (2004) calls for a ‘new-colbertism’, in other words for a European 
industrial policy: implementing a sector approach by launching large innovative projects in 
rapidly growing sectors; defining the sectors to be promoted; improving parallel conducts of 
competition and industrial policies. It suggests using the EU trade policy to help the industry. 
It also recommends that the State supervises production processes (filières de production).  
Beffa (2005) suggests the implementation of industrial policies again. The strategy would 
consist in launching programmes promoting industrial innovation (‘PMII’: programmes 
mobilisateurs pour l’innovation industrielle). Companies, experts and public servants would 
define innovative industrial sectors (like hydrogen production chain, biofuels, high-definition 
secured networks); big companies would receive subsidies if they develop research in these 
fields (50% of research expenses being covered by public funding) and would have to develop 
their network with small or medium size companies. So France would have ‘national 
champions’ in high-tech sectors (France currently has a too strong specialisation in nuclear, 
space and military sectors). The report leaves a question open: at what level should this policy 
be settled? Should it be at the French level (with a notification to European institutions) at the 
European level or within restricted cooperation between a small number of countries (like 
France with Germany)?  
Competitiveness Poles 
The development of ‘competitiveness poles’ (pôles de compétitivité) designed to help activity 
in given geographical areas is also a key measure of Datar’s strategies, as is the support for 
the building of firms networks (clusters). Competitiveness poles should be given a ‘brand 
name’; they should be advertised and benefit from lower taxation. Dedicated risk-capital 
should be developed, transport and telecommunication infrastructure should be provided. The 
link between national and European policies remains difficult to tackle.   
Both Grignon and Roustan Reports suggest a strengthening of the role of local 
administrations in supporting local firms and employment. 
5. Supporting unskilled employment 
Two strategies are often suggested to compensate for the negative effect of foreign relocation 
on employment. The first one would be to increase the level of employment in sheltered 
services, like construction, tourism, hotels and restaurants sectors (see Letournel, 2004 or 
Grignon, 2004) or to increase the size of the services to households’ sector (see Debonneuil 
and Cahuc, 2004). This would be done through tax incentives (allowing individual employers 
to benefit from lower social contributions as is already the case for companies), and through 
restructuring measures (making the services sectors more industrial and professional). The 
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French government has introduced such measures in February 2005. But this strategy may be 
difficult to implement due to social habits (getting used to hiring employees is something that 
needs to be learnt by households) and because of the reluctance of young people to apply for 
such jobs. This strategy implies a rise in income inequalities. 
The second strategy consists in cutting unskilled labour costs. Since 1985, companies get a 
rebate on their contributions on low wages, up to a maximum of 26 percentage points of 
employers’ social contributions (in 2005, on a total of 40 percentage points) for workers at 
minimum wage levels. This reduces by 18.6 % the cost of the minimum wage for firms. 
Besides, low-wage workers benefit from a refundable tax credit of 4.6 % of their wage 
earnings in order to increase the gap between the minimum wage and the minimum income 
entitled to adults unemployed and not entitled to unemployment benefits (RMI: revenu 
minimum d’insertion). This is a ‘making work pay’ measure. The social contributions’ rebate 
measure gives companies an incentive to hire unskilled workers (especially in services 
sectors) and can also help keep companies hiring a high level of low skilled labour stay in 
France. These measures cost 17.5 billions of euros by year in the French budget (1% of GDP). 
The social contribution’s rebate is estimated to have increased the number of jobs by 400,000. 
These rebates have the advantage of breaking the link between unskilled labour costs and the 
living standard of unskilled people. But they are costly for the Social Security budget on 
which they are funded and they lead to the creation of specific low-wage jobs with no career 
prospects.  
The Grignon Report (2004) recommends a measure often suggested in France in past years, 
which would consist in abolishing (or significantly cutting) employers’ social contributions 
and simultaneously increasing VAT. This reform aims at making the social security system 
being funded by consumption expenditures (and especially by imports) rather than by wages. 
The reform would entail competitiveness gains and cut wage costs in labour intensive sectors 
hence raising employment. In our opinion, the reform would be totally ineffective because the 
VAT weighs on wages (like employers’ social contributions) and not on capital goods (see 
Sterdyniak and Villa, 1998). Competitiveness gains would arise only if the rise in the prices 
of imported consumer goods resulting from higher VAT had no impact on wages, meaning 
that consumers would see their purchasing power reduced. 
6. The French fiscal measures 
The French government has introduced a significant number of measures, more or less 
successful, to prevent foreign relocation. These measures aim at providing an incentive for 
companies settling or to staying in France. They compensate partly for the high level of 
taxation in France.  At the same time, they add to tax competition.  
Since 2003, bonuses paid to foreign ‘high skilled’ foreign employees working in France have 
been exempted from income tax. This measure aims at attracting headquarters and research 
departments of big companies in France. The risk is that all countries introduce similar 
measures and raise tax competition at the expense of the distributional goals of income 
taxation. ‘High skilled employees’ will be less taxed if they work abroad than if they work in 
their country. These measures will be increased in 2005. In that field, European harmonisation 
would be useful.  
A research tax credit has been introduced in 2004 allowing companies to benefit from a 
subsidy equal to 45% of the annual increase in their research and development expenses plus 
5% of the amount spent. But, due to the European legislation, the tax credit has a relatively 
low ceiling. It would be useful to allow States to subsidize more significantly private research. 
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The 2005 budget has introduced several measures against the relocation process. First, 
companies relocating in France their existing production in non-EU countries benefit from a 
tax credit. Due to the European rules, this credit has a maximum of euros 100,000 in a three-
year period by company (50% of labour costs the first year, then 40%, 30%, etc.) 
Second, the French budget contains a number of measures designed to improve the 
attractiveness of French areas (‘competitiveness poles’). The idea is to give fiscal incentives 
to companies investing in high technology production in specific geographic areas. These 
poles must bring together Universities or training centres, public or private research centres, 
small and big firms, working together in innovating or specific production processes. These 
networks are expected to stop foreign relocation of these specific production activities.  
Last, companies operating in areas said to be ‘exposed to foreign relocation’ (areas with a 
high level of unemployment rate and a high share of industrial employment) are entitled to a 
tax credit of euros 1000 per worker. 
In all three cases, the measures have a limited amount. The costs expected in the 2005 Budget 
are respectively of 10, 50 and 330 million euros in 2005. Until now, these strategies are 
purely national and European rules are there to prevent their expansion. Is this a sustainable 
position for industrial policies in Europe?  
France has suggested increased tax harmonisation in Europe, which would raise difficult 
issues, because Member States wish to keep domestic fiscal autonomy and also because low 
taxation rates are sometimes a convenient way to compensate for insufficient infrastructure, 
low levels of economic development or company subsidies not being allowed. Making sure 
that the profit tax is based on the source principle, and not on the origin principle, would 
avoid purely tax-motivated relocation. More, the fight against tax heavens should be 
strengthened at a European or world levels. Companies and financial institutions should not 
be allowed to have branches in or to transfer funds to these countries.     
Company taxation amounted to 6.6% of GDP in France in 2002, ranking France 2nd in the 
EU-15, behind Luxemburg, against 6.4% in Italy, 5.2% in the UK, 3.5% in the US, 3% en 
Spain, 0.9% in Germany (where the figure was exceptionally low due to the tax reform). The 
current profit tax rate is 34.3% in France, at the level of the European average. It may be 
necessary to cut it down to 33.3%, but the effort to be done is limited (1.7 billion euros). The 
problem is not the level of profit taxation itself, but the fact that the wage tax (taxe sur les 
salaries), the tax on real estate (taxe foncière) and the professional tax (taxe professionnelle) 
add to profit taxation.  
The professional tax is currently based on tangible assets (real estate and equipment) and 
particularly affects production industries. Reforming this tax has been debated for a long time. 
Recently it has been suggested for instance in the Roustan Report (2004) and the Grignon 
Report (2004). The government has promised to reform the tax in 2006, without affecting 
local administration funding and without increasing households’ taxation. The new tax could 
possibly be based on value added (at the expense of trade sectors and financial institutions).  
The French government refuses to undertake a global competitiveness strategy that would 
consist in cutting directly wages or reducing company taxation together with lower public and 
social expenditures. In general, the search for competitiveness gains may be worthless, since 
the rise in competitiveness will be cancelled between European countries while European 
demand will be lower. But the recent example of Germany cutting domestic labour costs to 
win competitiveness and hence depressing domestic demand illustrates that an isolated and 
non co-operative strategy can always be a temptation for a country.  
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7. Conclusion 
The French government introduced several years ago cuts in employers’ social contributions 
on unskilled work. It has recently opted for helping high-tech sectors and specific French 
areas, the ‘competitiveness poles’, rather than implementing additional measures in favour of 
unskilled labour in traditional industries (textile, etc). It remains to be seen how many jobs 
this new policy will generate. Besides, the French government is in favour of promoting the 
emergence of ‘European champions’.  
The interconnection between national and European policies remains an issue to be tackled. 
Three answers to deindustrialisation may be considered in Europe, mirroring different 
political and social issues. First, some governments could choose to implement domestic 
measures, but would be stopped by European authorities, in the name of free competition 
rules. Second, some governments could implement measures without the European authorities 
interfering, but this would not be optimal: is it reasonable or advisable that a Member State 
introduces alone domestic taxation measures strengthening tax competition in Europe? The 
other risk is that national measures would be limited by the fear of European reactions. The 
best strategy would be that European countries adopt a common strategy at the European 
level. European authorities could reduce the importance they give to competition policy, 
initiate a reflection on the future of productive activities and employment in Europe and 
promote a European industrial policy as part of the Lisbon strategy. 
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